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Abstract 
Scholars argue that multinational corporations tend to locate their investment in countries with lower 
labor standards, but empirical results are highly inconsistent. In this paper, we investigate the effect of 
differential labor standards on the location choice of outward greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI) 
from Brazil, Russia, India and China (i.e., the BRIC countries). We find robust evidence that while there 
is a tendency towards the attraction of FDI by lower labor standards in developed countries, such a “race” 
is absent in FDI directed to developing countries. Location choice is highly path dependent upon previous 
trading relations between the home and the host country, which hampers the MNCs’ ability to arbitrage. 
Conversely, capital mobility at the industry level is found to intensify the race to lower standards.   
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A Race to Lower Standards? Labor Standards and Location Choice of Outward FDI from 
the BRIC Countries 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the debate on whether globalization has gone too far (Rodrik, 1997), a central concern of policy-
makers as well as researchers is that multinational corporations (MNCs) may relocate jobs from high to 
low standard countries, forcing a competitive downward spiral of labor standards. This is how the thesis 
of a “race to the bottom” (RTB) was originated in which such a race by corporations was criticized as a 
race “not of diligent but of laxity” (Liggatt, V. Lee, 1933). It is featured strongly in the heated debate 
among politicians and academics in the era of unprecedented movement of capital (OECD, 2001; Meardi, 
2006; Hansen, 2012) and the prevailing trend towards increased labor market flexibility across the globe 
(Standing, 1997; UNCTAD, 2003; UNCTAD, 2009; Siebert, 2006).  
 
This paper investigates whether there is a causal linkage between labor standards and location choice of 
outward Greenfield FDI from Brazil, Russia, Indian and China -- the BRIC countries. Therefore, we 
investigate whether MNCs “race” to lower standards in their location choice. The question of whether 
there are inter-state strategic interactions with respect to their labor standards is beyond this paper. We 
contribute to the literature in a number of ways. Theoretically, we probe the impact of labor market 
regulations not only from the production cost but also the transaction cost perspective, providing a new 
understanding of the impact of labor regulations on FDI. We also consider that potential host countries 
differ significantly with respect to their economic, social and cultural features (Krugman, 1994). Their 
significant institutional differences may lead to the presence of multiple equilibriums in which the effect 
of labor standards on FDI varies, a possibility not considered in previous studies. Third, we incorporate 
the insights from the behavioural approach, which interprets the internationalization of firms as an 
incremental learning process (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Ericsson, et al., 2000). As an important force 
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influencing the decision making of MNCs, this can interact with the tendency of seeking lower standards. 
Conversely, we suggest that industry mobility, as an exogenous factor that is innate to the production and 
distribution process of an industry, can significantly alter MNCs’ liberty in choosing countries with lower 
labor standards over those with higher standards. Our theoretical framework therefore provides us with a 
richer understanding of the complex relationship between host labor market regulations and MNEs’ 
location choice.  
 
Empirically, we adopt a mixed logistic regression method that considers both country characteristics and 
firm attributes to estimate the relationship between labor standards and location choice. We also use a 
novel firm level dataset of the Greenfield FDI undertaken by firms from Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study examining the relationship between BRIC FDI and labor market 
regulations. BRIC countries have a share of 46.3% of global GDP growth in our study period, and 
together, they are poised to dominate the global economy later this century the way Europe and the 
United States once did. Their outward FDI has outpaced that from the world in recent years (UNCTAD, 
2010). As their influence on the global economy grows, so do the risks for the sustainable world 
development, such as to what extent the rights of labor can be balanced against the rights of capital.  
 
Although the BRIC countries exhibit considerable variations with respect to their forms of government, 
political histories, economic systems and growth, their relevance for our research is that they all exhibit 
weak labor protection compared to more established economies due to combined forces such as 
increasing competition exposed by globalization, abundant labor supply, and their comparative advantage 
in relatively labor intensive industries (Arbache and Menezes-Filho, 2000; Desai and Idson, 2000; 
Frankel & Kuruvilla, 2002). Capitalizing on the flexible labor market in their home countries unattainable 
to their Western counterparts, BRIC MNCs may find it challenging to adjust their expectations and 
practices in host countries with more stringent labor protections (CNN International, 2007; ELRiS, 2009; 
Alvarez, 2010). The main contribution of our paper is in presenting an analytical framework to 
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understand firm level factors that either hinder or heighten firms’ arbitrage behaviour by incorporating 
insights from different theoretical traditions.  
 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the tendency to locate FDI in countries 
with lower standards is present only in developed countries but not in developing countries, 
demonstrating multiple equilibriums driven by significant institutional differences across countries. 
Second, previous trading relations between the home and the host country substantially reduce the 
tendency of seeking lower standards, indicating that location choice is highly path dependent. Third, we 
use two different industry mobility indicators, and find that higher mobility significantly intensifies the 
race to the bottom, suggesting that lower relocation cost facilitates MNCs to engage in fiercer inter-
jurisdictional arbitrage to maximize global efficiency. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
In Section two, we outline the literature background of our study. We develop our hypotheses in Section 
three. We explain our empirical strategy in Section four. In Section five, empirical results are presented. 
Section six discusses the results and concludes the paper with some managerial and policy implications.  
 
 
2. Literature review  
 
A frequent critique of globalization is that it can lead to a race to the bottom. More specifically, the race 
to the bottom hypothesis hinges on two important propositions. First, political scientists argue that states 
engage in policy competition to attract taxpayers, industry and other mobile units, such as FDI, that 
benefit state economies (e.g. Berry, Fording, & Hanson, 2003; Woods, 2006; Konisky, 2007). Second, 
economists suggest that MNCs may seek to increase their profits by investing in countries with less 
restrictive standards (Wolfgang and Levinson, 2002; Javorcik, and Spatareanu, 2005; Gorg, 2005; 
Drezner, 2006). While these are common concerns associated with globalization, empirical evidence from 
both disciplines remains inconclusive and insufficient, and studies on the relationship between FDI and 
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labor market regulations remain particularly limited (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005: 375; Bellak & 
Leibrecht, 2011: 1726).  
 
The current study does not tackle the first proposition of whether there are inter-state strategic interactions 
regarding how countries set up and adjust their labor standards in response to other countries’ decision. 
Instead, we address the second proposition, namely, whether MNCs choose where to invest based in part 
on the labor market regulations of potential host countries. Apart from potential welfare implications of 
the question, there are good reasons to study the impact of regulations on FDI in the International 
Business (IB) context. In contrast to the proliferating attention to the normative and cultural-cognitive 
institutions (e.g. Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Gellbuda, et al., 2008), the impact of 
regulatory institutions on FDI remains under-explored. But regulatory standards are a very important 
component of the formal institutions of a country (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). Regulatory institutions are 
explicitly codified in the forms of laws, rules and legislations (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Williamson, 
1991) that can be easily interpreted, planned and strategically manipulated by corporations.  
 
For the purpose of the study, we define labor standards as legal and regulatory restrictions on the non-
wage component of employment conditions (Ghose, 2003). Labor standards concern issues such as 
freedom from forced labor and discrimination, freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize collective bargaining, equal remuneration, abolition of child labor and minimum wage. Rising 
standards for all the working people is regarded as being synonymous with development (Singh and 
Zammit, 2000). From the standpoint of the neoclassical theory of the firm, there is a strong consensus on 
the dampening effect of higher labor standards on market entries of MNCs (Lafontaine and Sivadasa, 
2009). Higher labor standards adversely affect operational flexibility of MNCs. For instance, while strict 
hiring rules restrict temporary work agencies and the use of fixed-term contracts, tight firing rules make it 
difficult and costly for employers to lay off workers. Anticipating such constraints, foreign MNCs as well 
as domestic firms become reluctant to invest, which can then lead to chronic unemployment (Feldmann, 
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2009; Stel et al., 2007; World Bank, 2004a, 2004b). Higher labor standards also require employers to 
provide employment protection and other welfare benefits, which directly cut down profit margin 
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005).   
 
Despite the compelling theoretical view and widely expressed concerns among business owners, 
empirical studies are hardly conclusive. This is all the more remarkable since a number of studies 
employed the same dataset from surveys administrated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the 
US Department of Commerce. Some studies find that more stringent labor standards deter US FDI 
(Cooke, 1997; Cooke and Noble, 1998); others do not (Traxler and Woitech, 2000). Bognanno et al 
(2005) instead find mixed results depending on how labor standards are measured. Instead of analyzing 
the relationship between labor standards and FDI entries, Lafontaine and Sivadasam (2009) find that strict 
rules of hiring and firing delay the entry and reduce the number of outlets of an anonymous US fast food 
chains in 48 countries in the period of 2000 and 2003. Research based on data out of US FDI delivers 
equally mixed results. Kucera (2002) find no evidence that MNCs favour countries with lower standards. 
By contrast, Ham and Kleiner (2007) find that FDI flows into OECD countries between 1985 and 2000 
were negatively associated with the rigidities of labor regulations. Supporting evidence is also found in 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) and Gorg (2005) using European data. 
 
 
3. Integrating other theoretical perspectives: hypotheses development 
 
A few common traits shared by previous studies have motivated our research. First, most of them have 
focused on FDI from developed economies. But with the accelerated globalization, developing countries 
are now an indispensable part of the global economy. The behaviour of FDI from developing countries is 
receiving increasing attention, with particular interest in the case of China (e.g. Buckley, et al., 2007; 
Duanmu, 2012; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; De Beule and Duanmu, 2012; Li and Liang; 2012; Wang, et al., 
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2012). But no studies have investigated how developing country firms respond to labor market conditions 
home or abroad (Sanyal and Menon, 2005: 825). Second, previous studies have employed narrowly 
defined indicators of labor standards, missing the complexities of labor market regulations across 
countries. Third, with the only exception of Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2009) which uses a single 
multinational’s data, all other studies use aggregate data, which is unable to have direct examination of, 
and control for, firm level characteristics in estimation. We aim to address these empirical weaknesses 
using firm level information.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, previous studies fail to consider, at the firm level, some important 
factors that may hinder or heighten MNCs’ incentive to arbitrage. One of the factors, we argue, is that 
MNCs may have different mobility due to exogenous industry characteristics that are innate to the 
production and distribution processes of different industries. This has been acknowledged in previous 
work but has never been systematically examined. We are the first to measure mobility systematically 
across industries. Conversely, behavioural theories of internationalization (Johnson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Ericsson, et al., 2000) suggest that previous trading relations of MNCs may create an endogenous path 
dependency on their subsequent internationalization, therefore mitigate the tendency of choosing 
locations solely based on the level of labor regulations as suggested by the more traditional neoclassical 
approach. We also consider that the competition for capital among nation states in inherently 
asymmetrical. This is because nation states have to respond to external competition as well as internal 
forces, such as voter’s preference, deep-seated ideologies among their population, and nations’ 
institutional environment. This makes the competition for capital pertinent only among groups of 
countries with salient similarities, leading to multiple equilibriums. We proceed to develop our specific 
hypotheses.  
 
International regulatory studies suggest that when the potential host country’s regulative institutions make 
doing business across borders more costly, it will lose out in the inter-state competition because mobile 
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capital will locate investment to countries with lower standards (Chisik and Davies, 2004; Basinger and 
Hallerberg, 2004; Dewit et al., 2007). This argument is the central theoretical prediction shared by 
previous empirical investigations on the impact of labor market regulations on FDI, as well as other 
regulations such as corporate tax and environmental standards. The negative impact of stringent labor 
regulations on FDI, however, has two distinct sources. The first is purely production cost implication in 
the sense that when corporations are required to provide better welfare to workers, such as minimum 
wage, safe working environment, holiday entitlement, and pension plans, it will directly cut down profit 
margin, making the country less attractive than its peers with less stringent regulations (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2005; Lafontaine and Sivadasam, 2009). The cost implication of stringent labor regulations 
on FDI is no different from the impact of other regulations, such higher corporate tax (e.g. Haufler and 
Wooton, 1999).               
                        
However, overly stringent labor regulations can discourage capital not just because of increased 
production cost, but also because of increased transaction costs resulting from “uncertainty” for capital 
(Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). As demand changes and technology progresses, some investments prove to 
be more successful than others. The implication of stringent labor protection under uncertain environment 
is twofold (Haaland, Wooton and Faggio, 2003; Haaland and Wooton, 2007). One is that it will raise 
adjustment cost because MNCs cannot align their labor demand according to fluctuated market without 
incurring substantial cost. Two is that it will raise exit costs because of high severance payment (an 
important form of labor protection) in the event of investment failure. With the presence of stringent labor 
protections as part of regulatory framework of a country, the negative consequences of market uncertainty 
will fall largely on capital (the employer) in order to minimize the cost to labor. This extra transaction 
costs that employers have to bear is the second source of negative impact of stringent labor regulations on 
FDI. 
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The transaction cost implications of labor regulations have profound but unrecognized link to the theory 
of the firm. The key tenet of this theory is that FDI, as an equity based entry mode that entails substantial 
managerial control, will only arise when the transaction cost is lower within the firm’s boundary 
compared to that in the marketplace (Dunning, 1971; Buckley and Casson, 2009). This is informed by 
classical transaction cost theory (TCE), advocating that the essence of the firm is to use labor market 
contract to replace product market contract when the transaction cost of the latter is higher than the 
former (Coase, 1937; Yang and Ng, 1995). While nearly all studies adopting TCE in IB area focus on the 
variation of transaction costs in the market that subsequently explain when the hierarchy should replace 
the market as the optimal governance form (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 2009; Brouthers, 
2012), none approaches the question from labor market perspective that can explain under what 
circumstances that the hierarchy based on employment contract becomes too costly, therefore should be 
replaced by market-based transactions such as international sub-contracting. This is what makes the 
linkage between labor market regulations and FDI different from other regulations, such as corporate tax.  
 
The advantage of this theoretical reasoning is that it directly compares the hierarchy and the market under 
a unified contractual theoretical lens to understand which contractual arrangement is superior to the other. 
The prediction based on this theoretical lens does not rely on production cost implications that are critical 
for regulatory studies, but merely variations of transaction cost between employers and workers under 
uncertain environment would suffice a theoretical prediction. It also demonstrates how a country’s 
regulatory institutions can transform into variations of transaction cost at micro firm level which 
subsequently influences firm decisions. The linkage between macro institutions and firm transaction cost 
is ascertained by North (1990) that transaction cost theory should be understood in specific institutional 
context because institutions provide the structure in which contractual arrangement is made. Therefore, 
we argue, all else equal, because stringent labor market regulations tend to accelerate transaction costs of 
the hierarchy, FDI will be replaced by product market contracts, such as international sub-contracting. 
Conversely, when countries have poor labor protections, they may attract larger amount of FDI because 
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the regulatory environment makes it easier for the capital (MNCs) to shift the cost of uncertainty to 
employees. Although we cannot observe the substitution between FDI and other forms of 
internationalization which requires us to directly observe alternative options simultaneously, what we can 
infer is suppressed FDI resulting from more stringent labor regulations. We take the logic of production 
cost and transaction cost implications together and suggest our first hypothesis as follows:  
H1: All else equal, higher labor standards have a negative effect on the likelihood of the location chosen 
by BRIC MNCs.  
 
An important assumption of the RTB thesis is that international markets for capital are the conduit for 
policy independence between countries. Economists have stressed that capital and trade respond 
positively to signals that policy liberation sends (Besley, 1995; Bartolini and Drazen, 1997; Wilson, 
1999). However, Krugman (1994) argues that countries differ significantly from each other, which may 
render multiple equilibriums in terms of competition for capital. Political scientists find evidence that 
jurisdictional competition only takes a strong form among countries with relatively homogenous 
characteristics, such as their economic growth and geographic approximation (Simmons and Elkins, 
2004). Multiple equilibriums can also result from countries’ historical pathologies so that politicians 
cannot easily break with prevailing traditions for their policy setting (Brueckner, 2003), or countries’ 
economic status where nation states of comparable economic size and development tend to compete with 
each other for scarce resources (Kanbur and Keen, 1993). This argument concurs with institutional 
perspective that institutions define the “rules of games” and include laws, regulations, and cultures of the 
country (Davis, Desai, & Francis, 2000; North, 1990). Different cultural norms in relation to solidarity, 
equality and the role of the welfare state versus the market therefore give arise to divergence of 
government welfare policy making, such as those related to labor market regulations (Esping-Andersen, 
1999). More specifically, labor economists point out that there is fundamental difference of the working 
of labor market between developed and developing countries. In contrast to wage labor market and state 
welfare provisions in developed economies despite variations across them, labor market in developing 
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countries is far more segmented with a large informal sector, prevailing short-term employment 
arrangement, and a lack of social protections (Solow, 1990; Fields, 2011). The stark and persistent 
difference means the benefit of arbitraging across the two groups of countries varies significantly, leading 
to multiple equilibriums.   
 
It is noted that we do not investigate whether nation states engage in strategic standard setting, but seek to 
theoretically differentiate countries to examine whether BRIC FDI responds to labor standards in different 
ways. We suggest a differentiation can be made between developed and developing countries due to their 
significant economic and institutional difference such as standard of living, industrial development, 
political and economic governance (e.g. North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Meyer, 2001; Asiedu, 2002). We 
advocate that the negative effect of higher labor standards may be stronger in developed countries for 
several reasons. First, there is more similarity within developed countries in terms of their economic and 
institutional environment, which makes it more likely that they can replace each other as desired 
investment locations. Second, the business environment in developed economies usually is more 
regulated and implementations of regulations are more effective. This means that the regulatory 
compliance cost would be higher, generating larger benefit for arbitrage. In addition, more stringent 
regulations introduce higher information asymmetry for foreign firms, especially BRIC firms because of 
different home institutional environment, placing them at a more disadvantaged position in comparison to 
domestic firms (Mezias, 2002). Therefore, higher labor standards in developed countries would be 
particularly detrimental to BRIC FDI. 
 
This tendency can be disrupted in developing countries by a few countervailing forces. First, the overall 
labor standards of developing countries are largely on a par with those of BRIC countries. Seeking even 
lower standards may be theoretically possible, but the marginal benefit could be small. Being the largest 
developing countries themselves, their home markets provide ample space for firms to seek efficiency 
driven growth. Second, legal enforcement of labor market regulation is generally weak in developing 
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countries, reducing MNCs’ incentive to arbitrage. Third, BRIC FDI could be particularly welcome by 
developing world because of their emerging status in the world economy as well as perceived 
compatibility of their investment for the economic and social conditions in developing countries (Ma and 
Assche, 2011). Institutional similarity between developing host countries and BRICs can give BRIC 
MNCs initial advantages because they can utilize their experience accumulated at home (Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc, 2008: 975), which can mitigate the tendency of seeking lower labor standards. Therefore, we 
propose our second hypothesis: 
H2: all else equal, the negative effect of higher labor standards on the likelihood of the location chosen 
by BRIC MNCs is higher in developed countries compared to that in developing countries. 
 
Another underlying assumption of RTB is that capital has high mobility. Indeed capital is the most mobile 
factor of production, but mobility is hardly uniform across industries with different production and 
distribution processes. For example, mobility may be hampered by the extent to which the operation relies 
on complementary input bounded by locations, such as unique natural resource. Scholars have found that 
higher reliance on location bound natural resource, such as agriculture products and oil extraction, reduce 
MNCs’ ability to arbitrage on host country’s environmental standards (Ederington et al., 2005; Cole et al., 
2010). We suggest that this logic should also apply for labor standards. One of the reasons that this has 
not been considered in previous studies is due to the empirical challenge of ranking industries by their 
mobility level. In fact, previous research that did consider this only compared manufacturing with service 
sectors, assuming that service sectors have higher mobility (Ederington et al., 2005). But categorical 
variables like this have serious limitations. Apart from relatively higher mobility, service sectors may be 
more responsive to higher labor standards because of higher proportion of labor costs in their total 
operation cost. Second, service sectors can be argued with lower, not higher, mobility because of their 
contemporaneous nature of provision and consumption. In this research, we contribute to the literature by 
replicating the methodology developed by Farness (1968) to test the idea of mobility more systematically. 
We will return to this in methodology section. The hypothesis we like to propose is: 
 13/42 
 
H3: all else equal, higher mobility intensities the negative effect of higher labor standards on the 
likelihood of the location chosen by BRIC MNCs.  
 
Last but not least, we investigate the effect of path dependence on MNC’s ability to arbitrage. Both 
political scientists and economists that are interested in RTB thesis have assumed implicitly that the 
location decision of MNCs is ahistorical in part due to the use of aggregate data. But one of the key 
theoretical frameworks in IB area, the behavioural approach of internationalization, interprets that the 
internationalization of firm as an incremental learning process (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Ericsson, 
Johanson, Makgard, & Sharma, 2000; Casillas, Moreno, & Acedo, 2012). We argue that this approach 
has important insights to offer to regulatory studies. As expressed by Forsgren and Johanson (1992: 10): 
“International expansion is inhibited by the lack of knowledge about markets and such knowledge can 
mainly be acquired through experience from practical operations abroad.” Some IB research explicitly 
model the sequential nature of FDI entries, indicating strong path dependency attached to 
internationalization decisions (e.g. Chang, 1995; Gao and Pan, 2010).  
 
We argue that path dependency embodied in prior trading relations will affect BRIC MNCs’ location 
choice. Past research finds that the geographical expansions of FDI from China and India is highly 
dependent upon the export relations between them and the host country, as previous export cumulates 
experience and knowledge of the institutional environment and consumer taste in the destinations 
(Duanmu and Guney, 2009). The global expansion of Taiwanese MNC is found to be characterized by 
strong path dependency, through which they develop organizational capabilities based on their prior 
subcontracting manufacturing (Chu, 2009). FDI decisions subsequent to prior exporting experience are 
also introduced as an important evolutionary pathway of US MNCs overseas expansion (Vernon, 1979; 
Bevan et al., 2004; Fedderke and Romn, 2006). The evidence from these studies reflect that 
internationalization process from export to FDI as a process through which a firm increases its degree of 
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commitment to foreign markets and their level of knowledge about those markets (Welch and 
Luostarinen, 1988).  
 
This influence can reduce the tendency that MNCs choose location purely based on the difference of labor 
regulations. In other words, location decisions exhibit some level of organizational “inertia” (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984): MNCs may become attached to cognitive styles, behavioural dispositions and decision 
heuristics associated with their prior export experience. Path dependence argument recognizes that 
“history” matters, that is, a firm’s previous internationalization experience and its repertoire of routines 
constrain its future behavior (Teece et al., 1997: 522–523). Largely neglected in previous aggregate based 
studies, we suggest that prior exporting experience of BRIC countries will mitigate BRIC MNCs’ 
tendency of seeking lower labor standard countries in their location choice. Therefore, we suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: all else equal, prior exporting relations between BRIC countries and the host country will mitigate 
the negative effect of higher labor standards on the likelihood of the location chosen by BRIC MNCs.  
 
 
4. Research method and data 
 
4.1 Research method 
The location decisions of FDI have been estimated with conditional logistic regressions (CLR) in recent 
literature (e.g. Alcacer and Chung, 2007). But CLR is more applicable when there are a small number of 
options and there is limited independence among available options. This is because the estimations of 
CLR imply independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which assumes that the strength of preference 
for location A over location B does not depend on other options available (Revelt and Train, 1998). But 
this is hard to hold because behavioural decisions usually reflect trade-offs among multiple competing 
demands for the firm. Therefore changes in available options may alter individual firm’s preference, 
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thereby violating the IIA assumption. In addition, CLR, being fixed effects estimates, also assumes that 
the strength of selection is homogenous among individual firms. Therefore, it only estimates the 
population average selection pattern, omitting possible heterogeneity across firms or industries. To 
address these concerns, we adopt mixed conditional logistic regressions (MCLR). The advantages of 
MCLR are two-fold. First, it is better suited when selection for the different location attributes potentially 
vary among individual firms. This will allow us to estimate the effect of industry mobility and path 
dependency, and control the effect of other firm characteristics on their location choice. Second, MCLR is 
free from the rigid assumption of IIA. Therefore, it allows more flexible estimation based on random 
utility theory (Cooper and Millspaugh, 1999). The model was substantially developed by Train (2003) 
and applied by Basile et al (2008), which has a similar setting with our study. 
 
Following this, we let n=1, …, K representing the individual firms, and j=1, …, J the available locations. 
MCLR considers utilities as random variables, with Unj being the utility that firm n assigns to the jth 
location available. Let xnj1, …, xnjm represent the values of m covariates (e.g. GDP) measured at the jth 
location available to firm n. Now let us assume that the utility assigned to a location depends on its 
attributes, viz. 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝛽1𝑥𝑛𝑗1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑛𝑗2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑚 + 𝑏𝑛1𝑧𝑛𝑗1 +⋯+ 𝑏𝑛𝑞𝑧𝑛𝑗𝑞 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 = 𝐱𝑛𝑗
′ 𝛃 + 𝐳𝑛𝑗
′ 𝐛 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 eqn 1 
 
where β1, …, βm are the fixed regression coefficients, bn1, …, bnq are firm level random effects with q 
being firm level covariates, znj1, …, znjq are fixed values specifying the structure of the random effects 
(usually equal to the subset of the covariates xnji for which coefficients are random), εnj are independent 
and identically distributed random error terms, β = (β1, …, βm)’, xnj = (xnj1, …, xnjm)’, b= (bn1, …, bnq)’ and 
znj = (znj1, …, znjq)’. We make the assumption that the random errors follow an extreme value distribution. 
This assumption is mild and the model thereby specified is very flexible (McFadden & Train 2000). Let 
the random effects b be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with density f(b;θ), where θ is a 
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vector of unknown parameters. The probability that a firm chooses location j within the set of J locations 
is 
𝑃(𝐱𝑛𝑗) = ∫
exp(𝐱′𝑛𝑗𝛃 + 𝐳
′
𝑛𝑗𝐛)
∑ exp(𝐱′𝑛𝑗𝛃 + 𝐳′𝑛𝑗𝐛)
𝐽
𝑖=1
𝑓(𝐛; 𝛉)d𝐛 eqn 2 
Based on eqns (1) and (2), we assume that the location chosen by firm n among the J available locations 
is assigned label j=1 (and thus the location not chosen are assigned labels j=2,3, …, J). Maximum-
likelihood estimates and random effects distribution parameters are obtained by finding the values of β 
and θ maximizing:  
 
𝐿(β, θ) =∏∫
exp(𝐱′𝑛𝑗𝛃 + 𝐳
′
𝑛1𝐛)
∑ exp(𝐱′𝑛𝑗𝛃 + 𝐳′𝑛𝑗𝐛)
𝐽
𝑖=1
𝐾
𝑛=1
𝑓(𝐛; 𝛉)d𝐛 eqn 3 
 
4.2 Research data 
We use data of Greenfield FDI undertaken by firms from BRIC countries between 2003 and 2010 to 
estimate the expected relationship. Outward FDI from BRIC countries accounted for over 50% of total 
outward FDI from developing and emerging markets (UNCTAD, 2010). Compared to data of foreign 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), Greenfield FDI data is argued to be most suitable to study the 
relationship between the location choice of MNCs and host country’s regulatory environment (Tole and 
Koop, 2010). Our data contains 5057 creations and expansions of foreign affiliates by BRIC MNCs 
across 156 countries over the period of 2003-2010. We remove 354 ‘expansions’ from our data to focus 
solely on new creations. The data was provided by fDi Markets – a data service branch of the Financial 
Times. 
 
4.2.1 Labor standards and other key dependent variables 
As a measure of labour standards, we use first of all a composite indicator developed by Botero et al 
(2004). The regulations of labor markets are investigated through employment laws, collective relations 
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laws, and social security laws in 85 countries. They reflect the encompassing legal and political influence 
on labor related ‘laws on books’ and have been adopted in recent study such as Lafontaine and Sivadasan 
(2009). We use the average score of the three indicators as a composite proxy called employment 
protection laws in our estimates. Secondly, we use the Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
(FACB) right violation index developed by Kucera (2004), which largely captures practical problems 
associated with the protection of labor rights and has been adopted in studies such as Neumayer and 
Soysa (2006). The indexes from these two sources complement each other since they reflect de jure and 
de facto aspects of labor standards. Thirdly, we measure labor standards by hiring and firing rigidity index 
and wage determination rigidity index which are developed by Global Competitiveness Report by World 
Economic Forum. They are built upon questionnaire survey with corporate executives who have extensive 
experience in doing business across countries. The indexes largely reflect on their views of the actual 
operations of labor standards across countries, which are also the most widely used indicators in previous 
studies (e.g. Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005; Gorg, 2005; Lafontaine and Sivadasam, 2009; etc). We 
measure all indicators in a way that higher values indicating higher standards. Therefore, we expect 
negative coefficients to support our hypotheses.   
 
We explain other key independent variables. We differentiate countries by developed versus developing 
countries using income data from the World Bank. Industry mobility is measured in two different ways. 
We first follow UNCTAD (2010) in grouping FDI into primary, manufacturing and service sectors, which 
is similar to, but improves upon Ederington et al (2005) and Cole et al (2010). In this categorization, 
agricultural production/processing and other natural resource intensive sectors, such as mineral and gas 
exploration, are under a single umbrella of the primary sector. The rest is divided into manufacturing and 
service sectors. A second and more systematic way to measure mobility is based on Farness (1968). The 
assumption of this method is that within a nation, if a region were to produce twenty percent of the 
national output, it would tend to claim twenty percent of all geographic markets. Quite obviously, no 
industry is perfectly mobile, hence none will confirm to the pattern predicted by the hypothesis of perfect 
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mobility. However, the degree of conformity will vary considerably among industries. We replicate this 
method by using the origin and destination of output by census district for three-digit industries access 
from Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) administrated by the US economic Census in 2006. The degree of 
conformity is measured by a Chi square test with the results made comparable by correction for degrees 
of freedom. We then rank all industries in CFS and match this data with the industry information in our 
dataset to allocate each of them with a specific ranking value. It is noted that we only rank manufacturing 
and primary sectors where such data are available; service sector is therefore dropped from this ranking 
index. Appendix 1 lists all the industries in our data and their respective mobility rank based on this 
methodology. We then create interaction variables by this mobility index and labor standard indicators to 
test the third hypothesis. Path dependency is indicated by tracing the prior exporting relationship between 
BRIC countries and the host country to assess whether FDI locations decisions follow prior trading 
trajectories. The data was drawn from UN Comtrade database. Similarly, we create interaction terms by 
this variable and various labor standards to test the final hypothesis.  
 
4.2.2 Control variables  
Our country level control variables are as follows. We indicate host country’s economic size by its GDP 
(Chakrabarti 2001). We consider unemployment rate and compensation of the host country as labor 
related controls (e.g. Basile et al 2008). Corporate tax is included because it is argued to be a negative 
estimator for MNCs’ activities (Dunning, 2006; Zodrow, 2010). We adopt political risk developed by the 
consultant company PRS group, following previous studies on FDI from emerging markets (Buckley, et 
al., 2007; Duanmu and Guney, 2009). Rule of law is another institutional control variable, which captures 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts in a country. Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) are rarely studied in FDI literature, but its importance to developing countries 
lies in the fact that BITs may compensate under-developed institutional environment to help promote FDI 
flows. We have economic openness in the model to take into account that an economically open regime 
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usually gives investors more confidence. It is measured by the ratio of sum of export and importance to a 
country’s GDP. Geographic distance is our final country level control.  
 
The following are firm level control variables. First, we control the R&D intensity by using a dummy 
indicating whether or not the MNC is an R&D oriented enterprise (Delios and Beamish, 2001). R&D 
intensive firms may be systematically more discouraged by higher labor standards, such as employment 
protection, because they face more uncertainty about future development and hence value flexibility 
more. Second is the size of MNCs, measured by the natural log of MNC parent global turnover (Luo, et 
al., 2009). Large MNCs have lower marginal costs due to economies of scale. This could reduce their 
sensitivity to higher labor standards. However, a counter argument is that large MNCs usually have 
presence in multiple locations; such portfolio gives it a better ability to counter the risk or costs of a single 
location. Therefore its net effect can be ambiguous. The measurement of our variables, data source, and 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The correlation matrix of key variables is presented in 
Table 2.  
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Table 3 reports our results regarding our baseline hypothesis. We find that all four labor market standard 
indicators receive negative and statistically significant results. This lends strong support to our first 
hypothesis.   Then in Table 4 we split developed countries from developing ones. On the left side of the 
table, we have four models reporting the results of developed countries. We find that, apart from the fact 
that all four labor standard indicators received expected results, all coefficients that they receive are much 
larger than those in Table 3. This indicates a stronger race to lower standards. In stark contrast, on the 
right side of the table, the four labor market indicators attain different results in developing country 
sample. While wage determination rigidity turns to be a statistically significant and positive estimator, the 
other three labor standard indicators become statistically insignificant. This suggests that the race to lower 
 20/42 
 
standards tendency is completely absent. Taking these results and those in Table 3, we suggest that the 
results in Table 3 were probably driven by developed countries. We speculate that the reason of rigid 
wage determination setting becomes an attractive factor in model 4 of developing country sample is 
because it will reduce transaction cost involved when BRIC MNCs set up new operations in the host 
country (e.g., by reducing decentralized bargaining with individual employees, different labor 
organizations, and probably local governments). This arguably limits MNC’s ability to reduce wage cost 
because of the centralized wage structure. But in countries where wage costs are relatively low, it is 
possible that the saved transaction costs may exceed the increased labor cost that could arise from more 
decentralized wage setting, and thus, making rigid wage structure an operational advantage for MNCs. 
Taking the results across the four models collectively, our second hypothesis is supported. The race to 
lower standards is only relevant in the context of developed countries, where not only labor cost is higher, 
but also its non-wage standards, which makes it important for BRIC MNCs to arbitrage in order to 
achieve maximum efficiency. Such tendency is absent in developing countries.  
  
Table 5 reports the results differentiating three different industries as a rough classification of mobility. 
We find interesting results in service sector, where all our four labor standard indicators receive 
statistically significant and negative results. This indicates a strong race to the lower standards in the 
location decision of BRIC FDI. In contrast, in both primary and manufacturing sectors, none of these 
proxies receive statistically significant results. This lends us preliminary evidence that, assuming service 
sector has the highest mobility, the race to lower standards is only present in this sector owing to its high 
mobility. We use a more systematic measure of capital mobility to test this hypothesis in Table 6. As 
shown in Model 1, the variable of mobility is a statistically significant and positive estimator, suggesting 
that the probability of undertaking FDI is higher in more mobile industries. This result is consistent across 
all models. The interaction variable of mobility and employment protection laws is a statistically 
significant and negative estimator. This indicates that industries with higher motilities engage in fiercer 
race to lower standards. Similarly, in Model 2, we use FACB rights and its interaction term with mobility. 
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The result is highly consistent. The interaction term is a statistically significant and negative estimator, 
suggesting that the magnitude is intensified in industries with higher capital mobility. We continue to 
receive support in Model 3 and Model 4, where the interaction terms of mobility and other two labor 
standards indicators also attain expected results, confirming our hypothesis that capability mobility is a 
major catalyst intensifying MNC’s race to the lower labor standards.  
 
Finally, we move to Table 7, where we test to what extent path dependency, as indicated by prior export 
relations between the host and the home country, impedes MNCs from inter-jurisdictional arbitrage. The 
four interaction variables between path dependency and four labor standards indicators all receive 
expected results, though their coefficients are modest. Considering the fact that path dependency itself is a 
statistically significant and positive estimator in all models, we interpret our results as that prior export 
relationship substantially reduces the tendency for MNCs’ to seek lower standards in their location 
choice.  
 
6. Discussions and concluding remarks 
 
Our investigation has made three main findings. First, there is an overall tendency for BRIC MNCs to 
locate their Greenfield FDI in countries with lower labor standards when we do not differentiate 
developed from developing countries. But when we do, we find that this tendency is stronger in the 
former, but absent in the latter. This indicates the existence of multiple equilibriums where the effect of 
labor standards on the location decision of BRIC FDI varies across different institutional contexts. Our 
results are robust to including important control variables, such as labor compensation and unemployment 
rate. We do not eliminate alternative interpretations such as BRIC FDI may be deterred by high corporate 
social responsibility or lefty ideology which can associate with higher labor standards, but the possibility 
that these alternative indicators completely correlate with labor standards and BRIC FDI coincidently 
shares a same ideological stance in their FDI location decision is low. However, these alterative 
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explanations may be investigated further in future studies. More importantly, we find evidence that 
suggests that the race to lower standards interacts with factors, such as capital mobility and path 
dependency. While higher capital mobility triggers fiercer arbitrage by BRIC MNCs to maximum 
corporate efficiency, prior export relations between the home and host countries substantially reduce 
MNC’s ability to arbitrage. Although our study has limited comparability with previous research because 
of differences in data, methodology, and labor market indicators, we are more aligned with those 
supporting the argument that MNCs do arbitrage, since those studies focus mainly on developed countries 
as the hosting states (e.g. Cook, 1997; Cook & Nobel, 1998; Ham and Kleiner, 2007; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2005; Gorg, 2005). What is more interesting is that we uncover a few factors that attenuate 
the race, thereby providing some if not full explanation of why some studies have generated mixed results 
(e.g. Bognamo et al., 2005).   
 
Our findings suggest that MNCs do not race to the absolute bottom in their location choice, but the threat 
for developed countries to lose FDI from emerging markets to their peers with lower labor standards is 
present. While emerging market FDI represents a new source of global capital flows, the delicacy for 
developed countries governments is how to weigh the benefits and costs of attracting such FDI by 
adjusting their labor regulatory standards. By contrast, there might be little benefit for developing 
countries to lower their labor standard to attract emerging market FDI. Our analysis only focuses on 
MNCs’ response to host countries with varying labor standards; therefore, we do not provide evidence 
with respect to whether or not host states strategically manipulate their labor standards in order to attract 
more FDI. However, even in a static setting, so long as inter-country differences of labor standards exist, 
MNCs will arbitrage. Our finding in developed countries strongly supports this central hypothesis.  
 
Our empirical analysis suggests that it is better to separate developed countries from developing ones 
when studying the locational determinants of BRIC FDI as many important factors appear to have 
opposing effect, such as corporate tax and labor compensation. Similar views were advocated in Blonigen 
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(2005) that pooling developed and developing countries together as potential host country affects the 
estimation accuracy of FDI from developed countries in a review of a large number of empirical studies 
on FDI from developed countries since 1980s. Such empirical divide clearly calls for more theoretical 
development to provide systematic explanation on what explains such separate equilibriums in which the 
relationship between locational characteristics and FDI varies.  
 
For BRIC MNCs, attaining relatively flexible labor practices will reduce transaction and production costs 
in the host country, especially in developed countries, which may be critical for them to set up a 
foundation for their operation in the location. But in the long term, they have to consider the development 
of appropriate labor practices that not only comply with local regulations but also are conductive to high 
productivity and creativity a priority in order to sustain their operations. From this point of view, lower 
standards may generate short-term cost efficiency, but not necessarily long-term success. Managers of 
BRIC MNCs have to decide what their long term investment aspirations are and make decisions 
accordingly.   
 
From a theory point of view, our study suggests that the racing towards lower standards has its natural 
limits. The limits stem from the fact that corporate strategies tend to be affected by the organization’s 
experience; so long as previous experience was not driven by the same force, it will interact with the 
current decision-making, bringing some disruptions to the race. The limits also stem from the nature of 
business operation, namely, to what extent the operation requires complementary input from the location. 
This provides an avenue for nation states to increase their bargaining position in attracting FDI if they can 
furnish their country with, other than natural resource, inputs and assets crucial for MNCs that cannot be 
easily sourced elsewhere, such as business and technology talents, and flexible but transparent business 
environment and infrastructure. We also find that despite the global competition for mobile capital, some 
developed countries still maintain high labor standards to provide workers with decent working 
conditions, wage, and job security. The maintenance of higher standards may serve as a filter for these 
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countries to repel capital flows that are not best suited to the country’s history, traditions, or economic 
development. This could reduce the actual “loss” from jurisdictional competition, serving as a natural 
brake to the race to lower standards. We differentiate developed versus developing countries based on 
their significant economic and social differences. This is a top-down simplistic approach; future studies 
can model multiple equilibriums with a bottom-up approach to link corporations’ investment motives 
with potentially multiple competitions among nation states.  
 
We also find that integrating insights from different theoretical traditions has helped us generate a better 
understanding of the complexity of location decision of FDI. Future studies can also delve deeper on the 
implications of stringent labor regulations on employment contract costs in relative to product market 
transaction costs. Questions such as whether stringent labor market regulations unintentionally favour 
sub-contracting to FDI would be interesting to investigate to deepen our understanding of the firm’s 
boundary. The unprecedented FDI has brought welfare improvement to a large population around the 
world, such as bringing new job opportunities and technologies to the host country as shown in the past 
regarding northern FDI, much more research is warranted to see if emerging market FDI contributes to 
the welfare of the host country in the same way, and to what extent labor as well as capital (MNCs) both 
share the propensity brought by increasing globalization of southern MNCs.  
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Table 1: Variables and data sources 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Variables Measurement Data sources Min Max 
Dependent variable     
Choice  1= the country chosen; 0=otherwise This study  0 1 
Independent variables     
Employment protection laws  0-1; higher values indicate more rigid regulation/law system Botero et al 2004 0.15 0.83 
FACB rights 0-10; higher values indicate higher labor standards Kucera 2004 0.00 10.00 
Hiring and firing rigidity 1-7; higher values indicate higher labor standards Global Competitiveness Report 2002-2009 1.60 6.00 
Wage determination rigidity 1-7; higher values indicate higher labor standards Global Competitiveness Report 2002-2009 2.10 6.80 
Industry mobility  1-29 ranking; higher ranking indicates higher mobility  This study 1.00 29.00 
Path dependency  Natural log of BRIC’s export to the host country Comtrade 2002-2009 0.02 8.53 
Control variables     
Parent size Natural log of MNC parent global turnover  This study 2.45 32.57 
Parent R&D dummy 1=R&D intensive; 0=Otherwise  This study 0.00 1.00 
GDP  Natural log of GDP  World Bank 2002-2009 0.13 25.48 
Unemployment  Long term unemployment as % of total employment  World Bank 2002-2009 1.20 37.30 
Compensation  Natural log of workers' remittances and compensation of employees, paid (current US$) World Bank 2002-2009 12.45 24.61 
Corporate Tax  Average tax rate paid by corporations  World Bank 2002-2009 9.30 293.30 
Political stability  1-9; A composite index; higher values indicate higher stability PRS group 2002-2009 0.00 9.04 
Rule of law -2.5-2.5. A composite index: higher values indicate better rule of law World Bank 2009-2009 -2.34 2.13 
Economic openness  (Export+import)/GDP World Bank 2002-2009 0.01 26.17 
BIT            1= if the pair of countries has bilateral investment treaties concluded; 0=Otherwise UNCTAD 2002-2009 0.00 1.00 
Distance  Natural log of air miles between the capital cities of the pair of countries City distance calculator at www.geobytes.com 6.38 9.33 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of key variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1. Choice             
2. Employment protection laws -0.0873            
3. FACB rights  -0.0078 0.2756           
4. Hiring and firing rigidity -0.0705 0.2916 0.0869          
5. Wage determination rigidity  -0.0460 0.1662 0.2279 0.4154         
6. Mobility 0.3202 0.3453 -0.4933 0.0372 -0.2042        
7. Path dependence 1.0451 0.09322 0.0353 -0.0344 0.0456 -0.034       
8. Parent size 0.0022 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0013 -0.0000 0.4572 0.0345      
9. Parent R&D 0.0341 0.1471 -0.6093 -0.1458 -0.1589 0.3901 0.0234 0.0010     
10. GDP 0.0997 -0.0290 -0.3075 0.0502 0.1030 0.0342 0.3452 0.0018 0.6067    
11. Unemployment  0.0322 0.0341 0.0237 0.0348 0.0111 0.2941 0.0034 0.2191 0.0321 0.0212   
12. Compensation -0.0214 0.0123 0.0345 0.0234 0.0123 0.4324 0.4532 0.2903 0.0293 0.0763 0.2372  
13. Tax -0.0089 -0.0745 0.1976 -0.4283 -0.3028 0.0344 -0.0345 -0.0015 -0.0358 0.0696 0.0642 0.0346 
14. Political risk 0.0982 0.0823 0.0292 0.0383 0.0212 0.3027 0.0932 0.2076 0.2238 0.0023 0.0236 0.0204 
15.Rule of Law -0.2321 0.03463 -0.1533 0.0578 0.0438 0.0253 0.0234 0.0432 0.2789 0.1425 0.0046 0.2348 
16. BIT 0.0407 0.0650 0.1549 0.3658 -0.1194 0.2084 0.1156 0.0006 -0.2536 -0.2785 -0.3482 -0.0835 
17. Openness 0.0745 0.3342 -0.3305 -0.0399 -0.0992 0.0934 0.3342 -0.0007 0.0816 -0.4239 -0.3324 0.2450 
18. Distance 0.0389 0.2193 -0.5885 0.2612 -0.1881 0.0341 0.0234 0.0022 0.2766 0.2303 -0.3994 -0.0450 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)        
13. Tax             
14. Political risk 0.0219            
15.Rule of Law 0.0053 0.3701           
16. BITs -0.0385 0.0435 0.0324          
17. Openness 0.1324 0.0632 0.0367 0.1754         
18. Distance 0.0166 0.0148 0.02345 0.1027 0.0464        
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Table 3: The determinants of location choices of BRIC FDI: mixed conditional logistic regressions 
Independent variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Employment Protection Laws -0.682***    
  (0.016)    
FACB rights   -0.055***   
   (0.008)   
Hiring and Firing rigidity    -0.035**  
    (0.006)  
Wage determination rigidity     -0.037** 
     (0.006) 
Size  0.008 0.040 0.084 0.039 
 (0.066) (0.184) (0.054) (0.237) 
R&D 0.075 0.079 0.065 0.055 
 (0.502) (0.522) (0.502) (0.412) 
GDP 0.605*** 0.564*** 0.578*** 0.578*** 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) 
Unemployment 0.004* 0.005* 0.004* 0.005* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Compensation -0.080*** -0.091*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tax  -0.002 -0.000* -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Political Stability 0.029 0.552 -0.150 -0.001 
 (0.121) (0.174) (0.115) (0.117) 
Rule of Law -0.153** -0.043** -0.211*** -0.218*** 
 (0.053) (0.060) (0.053) (0.052) 
BITs 0.305*** 0.220*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 
  (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
Openness 0.495*** 0.547*** 0.451*** 0.453*** 
  (0.048) (0.114) (0.048) (0.047) 
Distance 0.285*** 0.262*** 0.141* 0.144* 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.061) 
Number of observations 83141 87674 88481 88481 
Simulated Log-L MXL -1539.2 -1543.7 -1558.4 -1559.2 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in a country j and zero for all others different from j.  Asterisks 
denote confidence levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, clustered standard errors in parentheses. In each 
regression, the error component includes all the dependent variables used also as location determinants, as well as 
region dummies. We do not report component results due to space constraints. 
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Table 4: The determinants of location choices of BRIC FDI in developed versus developing countries 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
Independent variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Employment Protection Laws -1.212***    0.746    
  (0.339)    (0.672)    
FACB rights   -0.169***    0.008   
   (0.037)    (0.026)   
Hiring and Firing rigidity   -0.133**    0.027  
    (0.055)    (0.066)  
Wage determination rigidity    -0.101*    0.380** 
     (0.052)    (0.073) 
Size 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.019 -0.219 -0.218 -0.211 -0.211 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.313) (0.312) (0.321) (0.310) 
R&D 1.074* 1.089* 1.077* 1.071* -4.585 -4.586 -4.588 -4.501 
 (0.546) (0.556) (0.557) (0.559) (3.016) (3.024) (3.016) (2.556) 
GDP 0.930*** 0.834*** 0.899*** 0.861*** 0.331*** 0.330*** 0.327*** 0.352*** 
 (0.069) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.041) (0.055) (0.036) (0.035) 
Unemployment 0.055* 0.111*** 0.005 0.056* 0.018 0.006 0.009 -0.020 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Compensation -0.096** -0.095** -0.094** -0.098** 0.044 0.085** 0.074** 0.059* 
  (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) 
Tax  -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.030*** -0.020*** 0.016*** 0.008** 0.009** 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Political Stability -0.132* -0.119** -0.171** -0.168** -0.003 0.038 0.068 0.171 
 (0.064) (0.071) (0.061) (0.061) (0.102) (0.117) (0.100) (0.099) 
Rule of Law -0.321*** -0.284*** -0.274*** -0.277*** -0.092 -0.067 -0.074 -0.055 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.063) (0.054) (0.050) (0.053) 
BITs 0.444*** 0.382*** 0.319*** 0.411*** -0.104 0.035 -0.006 0.059 
  (0.079) (0.076) (0.079) (0.077) (0.110) (0.107) (0.104) (0.104) 
Openness 0.593** 0.599*** 0.647*** 0.711*** 0.835*** 0.428* 0.450*** 0.512*** 
  (0.182) (0.174) (0.181) (0.178) (0.133) (0.195) (0.100) (0.098) 
Distance 0.452*** 0.467*** 0.458*** 0.266* 0.172 -0.027 -0.001 -0.073 
 (0.120) (0.104) (0.126) (0.122) (0.128) (0.097) (0.093) (0.094) 
Number of Observations 30946 30946 30946 30946 32786 32337 32337 32337 
Simulated Log-L MXL -789.4 -745.6 -775.8 -781.3 -586.3 -576.7 -556.7 -558.6 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in a country j and zero for all others different from j.  Asterisks denote confidence levels: 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, clustered standard errors in parentheses. In each regression, the error component includes all the dependent 
variables used also as location determinants, as well as region dummies. We do not report component results due to space constraints. 
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Table 5: The determinants of location choices of BRIC FDI in three industries 
 
 Primary  Manufacturing Service 
Independent variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Employment Protection Laws 0.300    -0.381    -1.800*    
  (1.508)    (0.824)    (0.809)    
FACB rights   0.039    -0.025    -0.152**   
   (0.052)    (0.041)    (0.037)   
Hiring and Firing rigidity   0.027    -0.031    -0.104**  
    (0.532)    (0.045)    (0.034)  
Wage determination rigidity    0.025    -0.039    -0.134** 
     (0.324)    (0.038)    (0.035) 
Size -0.159 -0.120 0.0134 0.0123 0.120 0.056 0.056 0.056 -0.049 -0.135* -0.135* -0.135* 
 (0.172) (0.073) (0.086) (0.087) (0.108) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.102) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
R&D -1.895 -1.931 -1.903 -1.902 -1.612 -1.706 -1.706 -1.706 1.899** 1.767* 1.767* 1.767* 
 (1.791) (1.818) (1.864) (1.862) (0.881) (0.898) (0.898) (0.898) (0.701) (0.718) (0.718) (0.718) 
GDP 0.492*** 0.497*** 0.499*** 0.495*** 0.781*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.727*** 0.587*** 0.587*** 0.587*** 
 (0.083) (0.093) (0.091) (0.092) (0.068) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.056) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Unemployment 0.089** 0.097*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.033 0.041* 0.041* 0.041* 
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Compensation -0.642*** -0.553** -0.555*** -0.554*** -0.536*** -0.584*** -0.584*** -0.584*** -0.702*** -0.311* -0.311* -0.311* 
  (0.149) (0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.118) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.107) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) 
Tax  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010* -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Political Stability -0.052 -0.057 0.023 0.031 -0.295* -0.324* -0.324* -0.324* 0.074 0.160 0.160 0.160 
 (0.186) (0.190) (0.134) (0.138) (0.148) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.137) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) 
Rule of Law -0.064 -0.066 -0.049 -0.051 -0.064* -0.055* -0.061* -0.062* 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 
 (0.122) (0.124) (0.121) (0.122) (0.012) (0.012) (0.12) (0.014) (0.432) (0.432) (0.432) (0.432) 
BITs -0.057 -0.075 -0.077 -0.076 0.191 0.190 0.197 0.196 0.189** 0.148** 0.189** 0.148** 
  (0.172) (0.171) (0.167) (0.169) (0.138) (0.139) (0.138) (0.139) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
Openness 0.134 0.392* 0.421* 0.420* 0.619*** 0.628*** 0.619*** 0.628*** 0.554*** 0.570*** 0.554*** 0.570*** 
  (0.177) (0.187) (0.192) (0.189) (0.116) (0.139) (0.116) (0.139) (0.090) (0.110) (0.090) (0.110) 
Distance -0.154 -0.130 -0.130 -0.132 0.252** 0.227** 0.252** 0.227** 0.098 0.203 0.098 0.203 
 (0.195) (0.198) (0.195) (0.195) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.050) (0.136) (0.138) (0.136) (0.138) 
Number of Observations 9323 9323 9323 9323 15303 15303 15303 15303 20540 20540 20540 20540 
Simulated Log-L MXL -160.47 -162.45 -166.43 -161.34 -312.30 -323.56 -324.32 -326.21 -342.33 -341.23 -375.23 -364.32 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in a country j and zero for all others different from j.  Asterisks denote confidence levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, clustered standard errors in parentheses. In each 
regression, the error component includes all the dependent variables used also as location determinants, as well as region dummies.  We do not report component results due to space constraints. 
38/42 
 
Table 6: The determinants of location choices of BRIC FDI: the effect of mobility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Mobility   0.464*** 0.453*** 0.465*** 0.461*** 
  (0.075) (0.066) (0.075) (0.072) 
Employment  Protection Laws -0.675***    
 (0.021)    
Mobility  *Employment Protection Laws -1.038***    
 (0.214)    
FACB rights   -0.058***   
   (0.016)   
Mobility* FACB rights  -0.104***   
  (0.015)   
Hiring and Firing rigidity   -0.031**  
    (0.004)  
Mobility*Hiring and Firing rigidity   -0.085**  
   (0.009)  
Wage determination rigidity    -0.042** 
     (0.005) 
Mobility* Wage determination rigidity    -0.102** 
    (0.035) 
Size 0.034 0.039 0.047 0.038 
 (0.054) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
R&D 0.065 0.067 0.069 0.062 
 (0.502) (0.531) (0.521) (0.522) 
GDP 0.578*** 0.603*** 0.623*** 0.632*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) 
Unemployment 0.004* 0.0043 0.003* 0.002* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Compensation -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.083*** -0.093*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) 
Tax  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Political Stability -0.150 -0.153 -0.157 -0.159 
 (0.115) (0.117) (0.119) (0.116) 
Rule of Law -0.211*** -0.038*** -0.107*** -0.199*** 
 (0.053) (0.036) (0.051) (0.057) 
BITs 0.202*** 0.312*** 0.223** 0.193*** 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.044) (0.050) 
Openness 0.496*** 0.553*** 0.493*** 0.445*** 
  (0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.040) 
Distance 0.122* 0.105* 0.133* 0.146* 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.063) 
Number of Observations 58448 58448 58448 58448 
Simulated Log-L MXL -1168.9 -1136.4 -1138.9 -1137.5 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in a country j and zero for all others different from 
j.  Asterisks denote confidence levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. In each regression, the error component includes all the dependent variables used also as 
location determinants, as well as region dummies.  We do not report component results due to space 
constraints. 
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Table 7: The determinants of location choices of BRIC FDI: the effect of path dependency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Path dependency   1.089*** 
88 
 
1.398*** 1.345*** 1.341*** 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034) 
Employment Protection Laws -0.570***    
 (0.011)    
Path dependency* Employment Protection Laws 0.036***    
 (0.002)    
FACB rights   -0.049***   
   (0.010)   
Path dependency* FACB rights  0.021***   
  (0.006)   
Hiring and Firing rigidity   -0.034***  
    (0.005)  
Path dependency* Hiring and Firing rigidity   0.028***  
   (0.007)  
Wage determination rigidity    -0.048*** 
     (0.006) 
Path dependency* Wage determination rigidity    0.065*** 
    (0.009) 
Size 0.084 0.094 0.091 0.084 
 (0.054) (0.058) (0.050) (0.055) 
R&D 0.065 0.098 0.097 0.085 
 (0.502) (0.532) (0.811) (0.543) 
GDP 0.578*** 0.601*** 0.634*** 0.593*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) 
Unemployment 0.004* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Compensation -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.085*** -0.086*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Tax  -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) 
Political Stability -0.150 -0.161 -0.157 -0.156 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) 
Rule of Law -0.211*** -0.201*** -0.203*** -0.191*** 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) 
BITs 0.202*** 0.204*** 0.228*** 0.216*** 
  (0.057) (0.059) (0.061) (0.0647) 
Openness 0.451*** 0.445*** 0.443*** 0.454*** 
  (0.048) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049) 
Distance 0.141* 0.145* 0.150* 0.146* 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.060) (0.061) 
Number of Observations 70844 70844 70844 70844 
Simulated Log-L MXL -1288.07 -1268.43 -1268.54 -1289.54 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to 1 if firm i is set in a country j and zero for all others different from 
j.  Asterisks denote confidence levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. In each regression, the error component includes all the dependent variables used also as 
location determinants, as well as region dummies.  We do not report component results due to space 
constraints. 
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Appendix 1: Three sectors and the ranking of capital mobility 
 
Primary  Mobility rank Manufacturing  Mobility rank Services Mobility rank 
Beverages 
Coal, Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Food & Tobacco 
Metals 
Minerals 
Paper, Printing & 
Packaging 
Rubber 
Wood Products 
28 
29 
 
26 
25 
23 
17 
 
21 
16 
Aerospace 
Alternative/Renewable energy 
Automotive Components 
Automotive OEM 
Biotechnology 
Building & Construction Materials 
Business Machines & Equipment 
Ceramics & Glass 
Chemicals 
Consumer Electronics 
Consumer Electrical Products 
Electronic Components 
Engines & Turbines 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & 
Tools 
Medical Devices 
Non-Automotive Transport OEM 
Pharmaceuticals 
Plastics 
Semiconductors 
Space & Defense 
Textiles 
20 
2 
10 
9 
5 
11 
6 
24 
19 
1 
3 
7 
12 
13 
 
14 
22 
18 
4 
8 
NA 
27 
Business Services 
Communications 
Financial Services 
Healthcare 
Hotels & Tourism 
Leisure & 
Entertainment 
Real Estate 
Software & IT 
services 
Transportation  
Warehousing & 
Storage 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
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Appendix 2: Destination country distribution across developed and developing countries 
 
 Number of FDI  Number of FDI 
Destination Country Developing 
country  
Developed 
Country 
Destination 
Country 
Developing 
country  
Developed 
Country 
Afghanistan 7 0 Luxembourg 0 3 
Algeria 12 0 Macau 5 0 
Angola 21 0 Macedonia  6 0 
Argentina 64 0 Madagascar 3 0 
Armenia 38 0 Malawi 1 0 
Australia 0 87 Malaysia 84 0 
Austria 0 12 Maldives 2 0 
Azerbaijan 37 0 Malta 1 0 
Bahrain 32 0 Mauritania 1 0 
Bangladesh 27 0 Mauritius 18 0 
Belarus 59 0 Mexico 0 73 
Belgium 0 32 Micronesia 1 0 
Bermuda 1 0 Moldova 8 0 
Bhutan 5 0 Mongolia 11 0 
Bolivia 8 0 Montenegro 3 0 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
7 0 Morocco 9 0 
Botswana 7 0 Mozambique 8 0 
Brazil 82 0 Namibia 5 0 
Brunei 2 0 Nepal 7 0 
Bulgaria 29 0 Netherlands 0 54 
Burma (Myanmar) 6 0 New Caledonia 1 0 
Burundi 1 0 New Zealand 0 12 
Cambodia 7 0 Nicaragua 2 0 
Cameroon 2 0 Niger 3 0 
Canada 0 61 Nigeria 39 0 
Cayman Islands 3 0 North Korea 5 0 
Chad 2 0 Norway 0 5 
Chile 0 22 Oman 48 0 
China 244 0 Pakistan 30 0 
Colombia 42 0 Panama 5 0 
Congo (DRC) 8 0 Papua New 
Guinea 
3 0 
Costa Rica 4 0 Paraguay 3 0 
Croatia 5 0 Peru 37 0 
Cuba 10 0 Philippines 54 0 
Cyprus 12 0 Poland 0 38 
Czech Republic 0 28 Portugal 0 20 
Denmark 0 16 Puerto Rico 2 0 
Dominican Republic 2 0 Qatar 26 0 
Ecuador 10 0 Romania 39 0 
Egypt 49 0 Russia 109 0 
El Salvador 2 0 Rwanda 4 0 
Estonia 0 15 Saudi Arabia 52 0 
Ethiopia 15 0 Senegal 3 0 
Fiji 1 0 Serbia 15 0 
Finland 0 7 Seychelles 2 0 
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France 0 80 Sierra Leone 1 0 
Gabon 2 0 Singapore 129 0 
Gambia 1 0 Slovakia 0 12 
Georgia 21 0 Slovenia 0 3 
Germany 0 238 South Africa 69 0 
Ghana 9 0 South Korea 0 29 
Greece 0 10 Spain 0 53 
Guatemala 2 0 Sri Lanka 37 0 
Guinea 1 0 Sudan 7 0 
Guyana 1 0 Suriname 1 0 
Honduras 2 0 Sweden 0 26 
Hong Kong 128 0 Switzerland 0 36 
Hungary 0 25 Syria 14 0 
Iceland 0 1 Taiwan 47 0 
India 125 0 Tajikistan 16 0 
Indonesia 75 0 Tanzania 12 0 
Iran 31 0 Thailand 62 0 
Iraq 6 0 Trinidad & 
Tobago 
3 0 
Ireland 0 11 unisia 1 0 
Israel 0 10 Turkey 0 38 
Italy 0 40 Turkmenistan 21 0 
Japan 0 75 UAE 248 0 
Jordan 15 0 UK 0 310 
Kazakhstan 71 0 Uganda 9 0 
Kenya 23 0 Ukraine 143 0 
Kuwait 12 0 United States 0 389 
Kyrgyzstan 6 0 Uruguay 17 0 
Laos 6 0 Uzbekistan 47 0 
Latvia 25 0 Venezuela 36 0 
Lebanon 1 0 Vietnam 116 0 
Liberia 2 0 Yemen 7 0 
Libya 9 0 Zambia 21 0 
Lithuania 23 0 Zimbabwe 7 0 
 
